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This article considers how domestic abuse is understood by policy-makers, legal and child 
welfare professionals and judges in England and Wales, and what the implications of these 
understandings are for proving domestic abuse and assessing risk in private law Children Act 
proceedings.  It focuses, in particular, on how the dominant incident-based perception of 
domestic abuse fails to capture the gendered nature and the ongoing, cumulative process and 
effects of coercive control. It explores how the incident-based approach, epitomised by fact-
finding hearings, together with the burden of proof and dominant images of ‘safe family men’ 
and ‘lying manipulative mothers’, compound the difficulties women experience in proving 
allegations of abuse. In so doing, it analyses the eight recently reported cases on child 
arrangements and contact in which allegations of domestic violence were made to determine 
whether any change can be discerned in how domestic abuse is understood. It concludes that, 
while some trial judges have a broader awareness of coercive control, the fact-finding 
process, with its focus on proving ‘the truth’ of individual allegations of violence, and the 
continuing drive by the appellate courts to promote contact ‘at all costs’, obscure the ‘bigger 
picture’, with serious consequences for the assessment of risk.  
 
Introduction (A) 
Since December 2015, there have been three developments in England and Wales which have 
important implications for private law Children Act cases where allegations of domestic 
violence are made. Coercive control - the most prevalent, devastating and brutal form of 
abuse by which men entrap women in personal life – is central to these developments.1  A 
new offence of coercive or controlling behaviour against an intimate partner or family 
member was introduced in December 2015.2 Women’s Aid launched the successful Child 
                                                            
* Lecturer in Law, Brunel University London 
1 See E Stark, Coercive Control How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (Oxford University Press, 2007). The 
title to this article pays tribute to this important work 
2 Serious Crime Act 2015, s 76 
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First Campaign in January 2016 with the publication of their ten-year review of child 
homicide cases.3 Finally, there was the successful appeal by Rights of Women in R (on the 
Application of Rights of Women) v The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice 
(the Rights of Women case), in which the Court of Appeal held that certain aspects of the 
regulations made under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
(LASPO), which stipulate the forms of evidence of domestic violence required to access legal 
aid in private family law cases (the ‘gateway’ evidence), were invalid.4  
 
This article considers how the ‘incident narrative’ that dominates legal and political 
discourses on domestic violence fails to capture and obscures the gendered relations of 
power, practices and effects of coercive control, and how this narrative is reinforced by the 
perceived need for evidence and proof of domestic abuse. In so doing, it undertakes a 
systematic encounter between Evan Stark’s pioneering account of coercive control, and the 
perceptions of and responses to domestic violence by politicians, policy-makers, legal and 
child welfare professionals and the judiciary in England and Wales.5 By examining the 
debates around LASPO and analysing all child arrangement/contact cases involving 
allegations of domestic violence which were reported after December 2013 (n = 8), this 
article considers whether courts have acquired a deeper understanding of domestic abuse, 
including coercive control, than was demonstrated in the past. It goes on to explore how the 
incident narrative underpinning the LASPO ‘gateway’ regulations and private law Children 
act proceedings, epitomised by the ‘fact-finding hearing’, compounds the difficulties victims 
of domestic abuse may experience in accessing legal and in proving in court proceedings the 
abuse they have sustained. Finally, it discusses whether the substantive and procedural 
obstacles to proving domestic abuse and impelling courts to prioritise safety over the 
promotion of contact may be overcome by eliminating the adversarial fact-finding exercise 
altogether in order to focus attention on risk rather than ‘the truth’ of allegations. 
  
Dominant narratives of domestic violence (A) 
                                                            
3 Women’s Aid, Nineteen Child Homicides: What must change so children are put first in child contact 
arrangements and the family courts (Women’s Aid, 2016). See also Women’s Aid, Child First: A Call to Action 
One Year On (Women’s Aid, 2017). 
4 R (on the Application of Rights of Women) v The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice [2016] 




‘A lot of men might not be beating up women, but they’re very controlling. Courts don’t 
understand emotional abuse… Unless you’re walking in with a black eye, trying to explain to 
the judge doesn’t work. They’re only concerned with physical violence – “has he hit her, no, 
then you need to promote contact”. (Kathy)’6 
 
The way in which domestic violence is understood in political, legal and popular discourses 
equates abuse with physically violent incidents. This approach assumes that abuse consists of 
‘discrete acts that can be sharply delineated and so managed within a tight temporal frame, 
like stranger assaults’.7 As discussed below, the ‘incident narrative’ has dominated the 
perceptions and practices of many judges, family lawyers and child welfare professionals in 
private law Children Act proceedings, as well as some of the provisions of Practice Direction 
12J (PD12J) (which stipulates best practice for courts in responding to domestic violence in 
child arrangements proceedings), ‘with the coercive and controlling dimensions rarely 
recognised’.8 Hunter and Barnett found a marked difference between ‘legalistic’ 
understandings of domestic abuse, focused on incidents of physical violence (largely held by 
family lawyers and the judiciary), and social science understandings, which recognise its 
power and control dynamics (more often held by Cafcass officers).9 
  
The incident narrative also underpins the recent reforms to legal aid effected by LASPO. In 
taking private law cases involving children and financial matters out of scope of legal aid, the 
government stated that the exception to this should be ‘where there is an ongoing risk of 
physical harm from domestic violence’.10 This approach received much criticism on the basis 
that it excluded other forms of abuse and was narrower than the (then) cross-government 
definition of domestic violence that was included in PD12J and was used by many other 
government agencies, which defined ‘domestic violence’ as ‘[a]ny incident of threatening 
behaviour, violence or abuse (psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional) 
                                                            
6 M Coy, K Perks, E Scott and R Tweedale, Picking up the pieces: domestic violence and child contact (Rights of 
Women, 2012) at p 51 
7 E Stark, Coercive Control How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (Oxford University Press, 2007) at p 92.  
8 M Coy, K Perks, E Scott and R Tweedale, Picking up the pieces: domestic violence and child contact (Rights of 
Women, 2012) at p 51  
9 R Hunter and A Barnett, Fact-Finding Hearings and the Implementation of the President’s Practice Direction: 
Residence and Contact Orders: Domestic Violence and Harm (Family Justice Council, 2013) 
10 Proposals for the Reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales, Cm 7967 (2010) p 42  
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between adults who are or have been intimate partners or family members’. 11 By 2014, 
however, both LASPO and PD12J included the new cross-government definition of domestic 
violence, namely: ‘Any incident, or pattern of incidents, of controlling, coercive or 
threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (whether psychological, physical, sexual, financial 
or emotional) between individuals who are associated with each other.’12  
 
Two aspects of this evolution of the definition of domestic violence merit consideration. 
Firstly, it demonstrates how the physical incident model, depicted by the terms, ‘incident or 
pattern of incidents’, or ‘acts’, which fail to capture the ongoing, cumulative process of 
coercive control, has been increasingly ‘stretched’ to incorporate what is usually described as 
psychological or emotional abuse.13 The binary juxtaposition of physical and 
psychological/emotional abuse fails to capture the embodied physicality and brutality of 
coercive control, although it may well result in psychological and emotional harm and have 
that intent. Evan Stark explains that, by describing non-physical forms of oppression as 
psychological abuse, it is ‘as if their primary dynamic involved mental processes rather than 
concrete deprivations and structural restraints’.14 Secondly, the term, ‘incident’, neutralises 
and obscures the gendered agency of the perpetrator of the abuse. As discussed below, by 
focusing on its patterns, techniques and tactics, coercive control can be seen as the 
performance of a patriarchal form of dominant masculinity, an ‘oppressive strategy of choice’ 
that enacts male power over women in personal life as a way of installing and preserving 
women’s dependence on male partners.15  
 
With these thoughts in mind, coercive control may best be seen as a strategy of techniques 
designed to achieve submission, constituted by modern disciplinary forms of power that 
‘operate principally through the human body’.16  These perceptions are obscured by the 
                                                            
11 See, eg, The Women’s Institute, Legal Aid is a Lifeline: Women Speak Out on the Legal Aid Reforms (NFWI, 
2011); Rights of Women, Violence Against Women in the UK: Briefing for the House of Lords, Committee Stage 
(Rights of Women, 2012); Hansard, Lords Debates, vol 734, cols 590-599 (18 January 2012).  
12 LASPO, s 12(9) and Sch 1, part 1. See also PD12J, para 3, which also describes ‘coercive’ and ‘controlling’ 
behaviour. 
13 E Stark, Coercive Control How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (Oxford University Press, 2007) at p 86 
14 Ibid at p 11.  
15 E Stark, Coercive Control How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (Oxford University Press, 2007) at p 193 
16 L McNay, Foucault and Feminism: Power, Gender and the Self (Polity Press, 1992) at p 46 
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incident narrative, the ideological effect of which is that ‘questions of power and material 
interest continue to be systematically marginalised and depoliticised’.17 
 
Understanding coercive control (A) 
A number of studies in the USA and UK have revealed the widespread prevalence of 
coercive control which ‘provide compelling evidence that a majority of abusive relationships 
for which women seek help are characterized by the range of nonviolent harms identified 
with coercive control’.18   
 
What is coercive control? (B) 
Stark describes coercive control as a regime of domination arising out of a combination of 
strategies entailing ‘a malevolent course of conduct that subordinates women to an alien will’ 
that lead to the entrapment of individual women.19  Numerous research studies reveal that the 
techniques and tactics used by abusers to exercise coercive control are striking in their 
similarity.20 Many of these tactics are the same as those used to extract information or 
compliance from hostages or prisoners-of-war, such as isolation, deprivation of money, food 
or medication, preventing communication and escape, and enforcing rules of conduct.21 
However, it is the particularity of coercive control, the way in which its exercise is 
insidiously calibrated to the specificity of the particular woman herself, that women find most 
devastating, and which distinguishes coercive control from the more depersonalised forms of 
entrapment experienced by hostages and prisoners of war.22 In this respect, men’s privileged 
access to women is critical to coercive control, as it enables them to gather unique knowledge 
about her movements and vulnerabilities.23 
 
                                                            
17 R Collier,  ‘Feminist Legal Studies and the Subject(s) of Men: Questions of Text, Terrain and Context in the 
Politics of Family Law and Gender’ in A Diduck and K O’Donovan (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Family Law, 
(Routledge Cavendish, 1st edn, 2006) at p 251 
18 E Stark, Coercive Control How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (Oxford University Press, 2007) at p 275 
19 Ibid at p 15. See also Home Office, Strengthening the Law on Domestic Abuse Impact Assessment (IA) (Home 
Office, 2014) at para 20 
20 See, eg, E Stark, Coercive Control How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (Oxford University Press, 2007); FI 
Matheson, N Daoud, S Hamilton-Wright et al, ‘Where did she go? The transformation of self-esteem, self-
identity, and mental well-being among women who have experienced intimate partner violence’ (2015) 25(5) 
Women’s Health Issues Online Early View 561-569; CK Sanders, ‘Economic Abuse in the lives of women abused 
by an intimate partner: a qualitative study’ (2015) 21 Violence Against Women 3-29 
21 E Stark, Coercive Control How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (Oxford University Press, 2007) at p 205 
22 Ibid at p 287  
23 Ibid at p 376 
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Coercive control has been categorised by professionals working with abused women into four 
broad strategies – physical violence, intimidation, isolation and control – that in combination 
form ‘a sustained pattern of behaviours’.24 Physical violence may be, but is not always, used 
by perpetrators of coercive control as part of the abuser’s repertoire of tactics, reinforcing 
other techniques of domination.25 Although some abusers may inflict severe violence, others 
employ frequent, low-level violence which becomes a routine part of everyday life, the 
cumulative effects of which are particularly devastating for victims.26 As discussed below, 
the dismissal of such violence as unimportant by courts and professionals means that patterns 
of coercive control may be missed and risk minimised.   
 
Abusers intimidate women by threats, surveillance, and degradation.27  Intimidation by 
surveillance is intended to impress on victims that ‘the perpetrator is omnipotent and 
omnipresent’, and includes stalking, listening in on phone calls, reading the victim’s mail or 
text messages, monitoring social media platforms, and interrogating friends.28 Abusers may 
degrade, humiliate and shame women to establish their moral superiority, by, for example, 
swearing at them, ordering them around, putting them down, enforcing rules and activities 
which humiliate or dehumanise the victim, or through visible marking.29 Coercively 
controlling men can also make women ‘question their own reality’ by thinking they are 
‘going mad’, using tactics such as  turning the gas on and off and hiding household items.30   
 
Isolation is used ‘to prevent disclosure, instil dependence, express exclusive possession, 
monopolize their skills and resources, and keep them from getting help or support’, by 
                                                            
24 Maddy Coy, Katherine Perks, Emma Scott and Ruth Tweedale, Picking up the pieces: domestic violence and 
child contact (Rights of Women, 2012) at p 22. See also E Pence and M Paymar, Education Groups for Men Who 
Batter: The Duluth Model (Springer, 1993); P Lehmann, C Simmons & VK Pillai, ‘The validation of the checklist 
of controlling behaviours (CCB): assessing coercive control in abusive relationships’ (2012) 18 Violence Against 
Women 913-933 
25 R Hunter, ‘Narratives of Domestic Violence’ (2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 734-776.  
26 E Stark, Coercive Control How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (Oxford University Press, 2007) 
27 Ibid; Women’s Aid, Nineteen Child Homicides What must change so children are put first in child contact 
arrangements and the family courts (Women’s Aid, 2016) at p 26; Home Office, Controlling or Coercive 
Behaviour in an Intimate or Family Relationship. Statutory Guidance Framework (Home Office, 2015) at p 4  
28 E Stark, Coercive Control How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (Oxford University Press, 2007) at p 255. 
See also Maddy Coy, Katherine Perks, Emma Scott and Ruth Tweedale, Picking up the pieces: domestic violence 
and child contact (Rights of Women, 2012)   
29  E Stark, Coercive Control How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (Oxford University Press, 2007) at pp 258-
260; Maddy Coy, Katherine Perks, Emma Scott and Ruth Tweedale, Picking up the pieces: domestic violence 
and child contact (Rights of Women, 2012)  
30 Maddy Coy, Katherine Perks, Emma Scott and Ruth Tweedale, Picking up the pieces: domestic violence and 
child contact (Rights of Women, 2012) at p 22. See also L Harne, Violent Fathering and the Risks to Children: 
The Need for Change (Bristol: The Policy Press 2011) 
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preventing women from working, denying them access to transport and/or means of 
communication, forbidding calls or visits to family and friends, and preventing them from 
calling the police or accessing medical or other support.31     
 
At the centre of the abuser’s strategy is control, ‘an array of tactics that directly install 
women’s subordination to an abusive partner’, by micromanaging their life and preventing 
resistance or escape.32 Control involves regulating the ‘minute facets of everyday life’ 
including how women dress and do housework and what they watch on TV, and depriving 
them of, or limiting their access to money and other resources.33   
 
The combination of these strategies, which are a feature of nearly all of the reported cases 
discussed below, are experienced by women as entrapment, and to understand this we need to 
replace the prevailing incident narrative of domestic violence with a pattern of techniques 
giving rise to an ‘abusive gendered household regime’, whereby abuse is embedded in the 
fabric of women’s everyday lives and parenting practices.34  
 
The gendered nature of coercive control (B) 
‘Domestic violence is a largely male problem. … The overwhelming number of those 
inflicting domestic violence on their spouses and partners and children are men. The first step 
to sweeping domestic violence under the carpet is for men to make the statement that it is a 
problem which affects both sexes. Of course it does, but the statistics are a chilling reminder 
of the fact that the overwhelming majority of perpetrators are men.’35 
 
The substantial statistical evidence referred to by Lord Justice Wall attests to the higher 
prevalence, persistence and severity of violence inflicted by men against female partners than 
                                                            
31 E Stark, Coercive Control How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (Oxford University Press, 2007) at p 262. 
See also Maddy Coy, Katherine Perks, Emma Scott and Ruth Tweedale, Picking up the pieces: domestic violence 
and child contact (Rights of Women, 2012); Women’s Aid, Nineteen Child Homicides: What must change so 
children are put first in child contact arrangements and the family courts (Women’s Aid, 2016)  
32 E Stark, Coercive Control How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (Oxford University Press, 2007) at p 271 
33 Ibid at p 274. See also Maddy Coy, Katherine Perks, Emma Scott and Ruth Tweedale, Picking up the pieces: 
domestic violence and child contact (Rights of Women, 2012); Home Office, Controlling or Coercive Behaviour 
in an Intimate or Family Relationship. Statutory Guidance Framework (Home Office, 2015) 
34 Morris A, ‘Gendered dynamics of abuse and violence in families: considering the abusive household 
gendered regime’ (2009) 18(6) Child Abuse Review 414-487 at p 414.   
35 Wall LJ, ‘Enforcement of Contact Orders’ [2005] 35 Family Law 26-32 at p 30.  
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vice versa.36  However, understanding the role of gender in domestic abuse is not simply a 
numbers game. Coercive control is, above all, a gendered strategy of domination of women 
by men, ‘designed to deny women a personal life’.37 The way in which coercive control 
targets stereotypical female roles may be overlooked because, despite women’s increasing 
formal liberation, its tactics are embedded in still taken-for-granted feminised norms of what 
it means to be a ‘good’ partner, wife or mother, ‘or target devalued activities to which women 
are already consigned, like cooking, cleaning, and child care’.38  This can give rise to 
‘enormous ambiguity’ about where ‘normal’ family life ends and subjugation begins.39 
 
Of course, women may assault men and other women, and use violence to coercively control 
them. However, ‘[n]othing men experience in the normal course of their everyday lives 
resembles this conspicuous form of subjugation’.40 This is not because men have a greater 
inherent capacity than women for violence but because the abuser’s model of masculinity 
reflects, is shaped and reinforced by, and enacts ideological and discursive conceptions of 
male dominance arising out of persisting structural and material gender inequality in wider 
society.41 With women’s increasing formal liberation in the public sphere, men who practice 
coercive control are ‘doing’ or ‘performing’ a model of masculinity designed to solidify 
‘women’s generic obedience to male authority’ by forcibly imposing stereotypes of 
femininity on female partners in the only arena they can still do so in modern society – 
personal life.42 Although most men concede their privileges or at least accept that they should 
be compromised, many men do enforce the material, tangible and symbolic advantages they 
gain from dominating, exploiting and entrapping female partners. Discourses of gender 
equality and neutrality that have increasingly dominated political, legal and economic 
discourses in many Western democracies since the 1970s have enabled many women to 
benefit from increasing economic independence and civic rights. However, those same 
discourses and ideologies can work to mask the gendered strategies of coercive control and 
its structural and material foundations, which conceal it from official gaze while allowing it 
to flourish in the privacy of personal life. 
                                                            
36 Crown Prosecution Service, Violence Against Women and Girls: Crime Report 2011-2012 (CPS, 2012); Office 
for National Statistics, Focus on: Violent Crime and Sexual Offences 2013/2014 (ONS Bulletin, 2015) 
37 E Stark, Coercive Control How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (Oxford University Press, 2007) at p 387 
38 Ibid at pp 210-211 
39 Ibid at p 211 
40 Ibid at p 15 
41 Ibid 




Coercive control v dominant narratives of domestic violence (B) 
The degendered, incident-based approach to domestic violence means that the seriousness of 
the abuse is defined almost solely by individual acts of physical violence which frequently 
give rise to the entirely unrealistic assumption that between incidents of physical violence, 
‘normal’ family life carries on and victims have decisional autonomy.  These beliefs ‘are 
demonstrably false in the millions of cases where abuse is unrelenting, volitional space 
closed, or decisional autonomy is significantly compromised’.43   
 
Additionally, disaggregating individual incidents of violence gives rise to the assumption that 
the abuse has ended if the ‘only’ allegations of abuse are ‘old’ or ‘historic’. This fails to 
reflect the ongoing, cumulative nature of coercive control and its effects, where there is no 
clear beginning or end to the abuse, the lasting impact of which is frequently far from 
historic. It also means that the many other techniques and tactics that constitute patterns of 
ongoing controlling, intimidating and isolating behaviour may be downgraded or rendered 
invisible, and that the continuing ‘terrorizing effect’ of such ‘historic’ abuse may be missed.44 
 
A further assumption embedded in the dominant incident narrative is that, once partners have 
separated, the abuse ends. This fundamentally misunderstands how coercive control can 
persist and even escalate after victim and perpetrator have separated, because a primary aim 
of coercively controlling men is to keep the relationship going at all costs.45 This explains 
why a history of coercive and controlling behaviour has been found to be a key predictor of 
post-separation abuse, and the risk of severe or fatal injury increases on separation, as the 
abuser tries to regain his power and control over the woman.46   
 
                                                            
43 Ibid at p 115 
44 R Hunter and A Barnett, Fact-Finding Hearings and the Implementation of the President’s Practice Direction: 
Residence and Contact Orders: Domestic Violence and Harm (Family Justice Council, 2013) at p 17  
45 Ibid at p 57. Similar findings were made by C Godsey and R Ribonson, ‘Post-Separation Abuse Featured in the 
New Duluth Power and Control Wheel’ (2013) Family & Intimate Partner Violence Quarterly 101-105; R Thiara, 
C Harrison and University of Warwick, Safe not sorry: Supporting the campaign for safer child contact 
(Women’s Aid, 2016) 
46 B Featherstone & S Peckover, ‘Letting them get away with it: Fathers, domestic violence and child welfare’ 
(2007) 27(2) Critical Social Policy 181-202; P Ornstein & J Rickne, ‘When does intimate partner violence 
continue after separation?’ (2013) 19(3) Violence Against Women 617-633  
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By disaggregating physical violence into discrete incidents, the cumulative impact of the 
myriad of other tactics, which may include frequent, ‘minor’ physical violence, is ignored.47  
This means that children’s and women’s experiences of coercive control are obscured and 
discounted, and a core tactic of coercive control – the denial of a voice to the women who are 
subjected to it – is reinforced. 48   
 
The effects of coercive control on women and children (B) 
‘[T]he single most important characteristic of woman battering is that the weight of multiple 
harms is borne by the same person, giving abuse a cumulative effect that is far greater than 
the mere sum of its parts.’49  
 
It is important to understand that the entrapment and fear generated by coercive control are 
the cumulative effects of an ongoing course of malevolent conduct, experienced as chronic 
rather than episodic. Women may suffer a range of physical and psychological health 
problems, symptoms and disorders such as depression, chronic pain, sleep and appetite 
disorders, anxiety disorders, substance use and suicidal behaviour.50  They may also 
experience ‘profound disempowerment’ and a loss of self and confidence because of the 
constraints on their agency and ability to make their own choices and decisions.51  The 
deployment and effects of coercive control on migrant and refugee women can be particularly 
severe, as lack of support and information and language barriers ‘give their abusive husbands 
total power to define their world’.52 
 
Living with domestic abuse can also be extremely harmful to children. The devastating 
physical, psychological, emotional and developmental harm that children exposed to 
domestic violence can suffer is now well known by legal and child welfare professionals, 
                                                            
47 E Stark, Coercive Control How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (Oxford University Press, 2007) at p 95  
48 Ibid at pp 110-111 
49 Ibid at p 94 
50 E Stark, Coercive Control How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (Oxford University Press, 2007); G Dillon, 
R  Hussain, D Loxton & S Rahman, ‘ Mental and physical health and intimate partner violence against women: a 
review of the literature’ (2013) International Journal of Family Medicine 1–15. 
51 Katz E, ‘Beyond the Physical Incident Model: How Children Living with Domestic Violence are Harmed By and 
Resist Regimes of Coercive Control’ (2015) Child Abuse Review (Wiley Online Library). See also FI Matheson, N 
Daoud, S Hamilton-Wright et al, ‘Where did she go? The transformation of self-esteem, self-identity, and 
mental well-being among women who have experienced intimate partner violence’ (2015) 25(5) Women’s 
Health Issues Online Early View 561-56 
52 R Hunter, ‘Narratives of Domestic Violence’ (2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 734-776 at p 745. See also S 
Anitha, ‘No recourse, no support: State policy and practice towards South Asian women facing domestic 
violence in England’ (2010) 40(2) British Journal of Social Work 462-479 
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judges and policy makers, and is reflected in the definition of harm in the Children Act 
1989,53 and in Paragraph 5 of PD12J, which states that: 
 
‘Domestic violence and abuse is harmful to children, and/or puts children at risk of harm, 
whether they are subjected to violence or abuse, or witness one of their parents being violent 
or abusive to the other parent, or live in a home in which violence or abuse is perpetrated 
(even if the child is too young to be conscious of the behaviour). Children may suffer direct 
physical, psychological and/or emotional harm from living with violence or abuse, and may 
also suffer harm indirectly where the violence or abuse impairs the parenting capacity of 
either or both of their parents.’ 
   
However, an increasing body of research reveals that the most devastating harms to children 
may arise out of living in coercively controlling household regimes. Children whose fathers 
coercively control their mothers may be exposed to the constant abuse of their mothers and 
suffer from economic and physical deprivation and social isolation, thereby experiencing 
entrapment themselves, which can contribute to a range of emotional and behavioural 
problems.54 Coercive control may also have a serious impact on children’s relationships with 
their mothers, as a common tactic of coercive controllers is to manipulate, undermine and 
distort the mother/child relationship by, for example, demeaning and belittling women in 
front of children, encouraging children to participate in the abuse, preventing mother and 
child spending time together, and involving them in secrecy about the abuse.55   
 
Post-separation child arrangements and contact, and protracted proceedings, can be a route to 
continue abuse of the mother by using and manipulating children to control mothers, 
undermining the mother’s parenting abilities, interrogating children about their mothers’ 
                                                            
53 Children Act 1989, s 31(9) 
54 S Holt, H Buckley & S Whelan, ‘The impact of exposure to domestic violence on children and young people: a 
literature review’ (2008) 32 Child Abuse & Neglect 797-810; L Dunstan, J Bellamy & S Evans, Links between 
coercive controlling violence, parenting problems and children’s behaviours (Parramatta Family Relationship 
Centre, Australia, 2012); E Katz, ‘Beyond the Physical Incident Model: How Children Living with Domestic 
Violence are Harmed By and Resist Regimes of Coercive Control’ (2015) Child Abuse Review (Wiley Online 
Library) 
55 F Buchanan, ‘Addressing the Impact of Domestic Violence on Mothers’ Relationships With Their Infants’ 
(2014) 6(3) Family and Intimate Partner Violence Quarterly 41-46; C Sturge and D Glaser, ‘Contact and 
Domestic Violence: The Experts’ Court Report (2000) 30 Family Law 615-629; L Bancroft, JG Silverman & D 
Ritchie, The Batterer as Parent: Addressing the Impact of Domestic Violence on Family Dynamics (2nd edn, 
London: Sage, 2012); R K Thiara & C Humphreys, ‘Absent presence: the ongoing impact of men’s violence on 
the mother-child relationship’ (2015) Child and Family Social Work (published online) 
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lives, making negative comments about their mothers, asking them to relay abusive or subtly 
threatening messages, and tracking women down by initiating proceedings.56 At the most 
serious level, coercive control has been highlighted as a particular risk factor in child 
homicides that have occurred during post-separation contact.57   
 
A full understanding of coercive control and its effects on women and children is, therefore, 
essential to the proper assessment of risk in private law Children Act proceedings.  
 
Judicial and professional understanding of coercive control (A) 
A number of commentators have pointed to the separate and distinct ways in which men and 
masculinities are constructed in different legal contexts, and sometimes even in the same 
context, which can ‘serve to obscure men’s multiple identities’.58 So in the criminal justice 
context, violent men are constructed as perpetrators and offenders, ‘while in private law 
Children Act proceedings men are primarily constructed as caregivers, underpinned by safe, 
familial masculinity’, reinforced by the strong presumption of the benefits of contact between 
children and non-resident fathers.59 Marianne Hester observes the ‘differences in culture, 
practice and discourse’ between professionals and practitioners working in criminal justice, 
child protection and private family law proceedings as so striking that they could be said to 
occupy three different ‘planets’.60 Judicial and professional understandings of domestic abuse 
go a long way to explain and reinforce this ideological divide.   
 
Judicial and professional perceptions of domestic abuse before 2014 (B) 
                                                            
56 L Harne, Violent Fathering and the Risks to Children: The Need for Change (Bristol: The Policy Press 2011); C 
Godsey and R Robinson, ‘Post-Separation Abuse Featured in the New Duluth Power and Control Wheel’ (2013) 
Family and Intimate Partner Violence Quarterly 101-105; RK Thiara & C Humphreys, ‘Absent presence: the 
ongoing impact of men’s violence on the mother-child relationship’ (2015) Child and Family Social Work 
(published online) 
57 M Brandon, P Belderson, C Warren et al, Analysing child deaths and serious injury through abuse and 
neglect: what can we learn? Research Report RR023 (DCSF, 2008); S Vincent, Child death and serious case 
review processes in the UK Research Brief No. 5 (University of Edinburgh 2009); Women’s Aid, Nineteen Child 
Homicides. What must change so children are put first in child contact arrangements and the family courts 
(Women’s Aid, 2016) 
58 B Featherstone and S Peckover, ‘Letting them get away with it: Fathers, domestic violence and child welfare’ 
(2007) 27(2) Critical Social Policy 181-202 at p 182 
59 A Barnett, Contact at all costs? Domestic violence, child contact and the practices of the family courts and 
professionals (Brunel University, 2014) at p 114. See also M Eriksson and M Hester, ‘Violent Men as Good-
enough Fathers?: A Look at England and Sweden’ (2001) 7(7) Violence Against Women 779-798.  
60 M Hester, ‘The Three Planet Model: Towards an Understanding of Contradictions in Approaches to Women 
and Children’s Safety in Contexts of Domestic Violence’ (2011) 41(5) British Journal of Social Work 837-853  
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Research and case law prior to the implementation of PD12J in 2008 revealed that courts 
minimised, equalised and neutralised domestic violence, even in cases of very severe physical 
violence, which meant that it was often disregarded and considered irrelevant to contact.61 
Coercive control, at that time, did not even feature in legal discourse. However, research 
undertaken since PD12J was implemented, but prior to 2014, indicates that some judges and 
professionals working in the family justice system have acquired a greater awareness that 
domestic violence is not limited to incidents of physical violence and can include emotional 
abuse, financial control and denigration of the mother.62 Cases reported after PD12J was 
implemented also indicate that a few judges were starting to recognise the coercively 
controlling nature of domestic violence, as well as the many ways in which that control can 
be exercised. For instance in Re S (A Child), the trial judge opened up to scrutiny the father’s 
conduct towards the mother, which included following the mother in his car, sending her 
numerous bullying and derogatory text messages, insisting that the child be enrolled at a 
nursery of his choice, and restricting the mother from living and working where she chose.63 
Although the mother had been physically violent to the father, the judge concluded that he 
was the abusive parent, recognising that his conduct formed a pattern of domineering and 
controlling behaviour, which was an inseparable aspect of his own parenting of the child.  
 
Despite this increased awareness, a number of post-2008 studies highlighted the way in 
which many family judges and professionals lacked insight into the gendered and pervasive 
nature of coercive control and its effects on women and children.64 Family lawyers tended to 
perceive domestic violence in narrower terms than did Cafcass officers, who had a better 
understanding of the nature and seriousness of patterns of coercive control.65 For most judges 
and legal professionals, any form of abuse other than physical assault was not ‘real’ violence, 
                                                            
61 A Perry and B Rainey, ‘Supervised, Supported and Indirect Contact Orders: Research Findings’ (2007) 21 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 21-47; C Harrison, ‘Implacably Hostile or Appropriately 
Protective?: Women Managing Child Contact in the Context of Domestic Violence’ (2008) 14(4) Violence 
Against Women 381-405 
62 A Barnett, ‘Contact at all costs? Domestic violence and children’s welfare’ (2014) Child and Family Law 
Quarterly 439-462;  R Hunter and A Barnett, Fact-Finding Hearings and the Implementation of the President’s 
Practice Direction: Residence and Contact Orders: Domestic Violence and Harm (Family Justice Council, 2013 
63 Re S (A Child) [2012] EWCA Civ 1031; see also Re W (Children) [2012] EWCA Civ 528 
64 Maddy Coy, Katherine Perks, Emma Scott and Ruth Tweedale, Picking up the pieces: domestic violence and 
child contact (Rights of Women, 2012); Thiara R and Gill A, Domestic Violence, Child Contact, Post-Separation 
Violence: Experiences of South Asian and African-Caribbean Women and Children (London: NSPCC 2012)   
65 R Hunter and A Barnett, Fact-Finding Hearings and the Implementation of the President’s Practice Direction: 
Residence and Contact Orders: Domestic Violence and Harm (Family Justice Council, 2013) 
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as they failed to identify ‘seemingly minor incidents as part of ongoing patterns of significant 
and highly dangerous controlling behaviour’.66  
 
The recent criminalisation of coercive control is indicative of the increased awareness, in the 
political arena, of the harm posed by coercive and controlling behaviour. The discussion that 
follows questions whether family judges and professionals ‘have made the same progress in 
recognising and responding to domestic abuse that the criminal courts have’.67   
 
Coercive control: current judicial and professional perceptions and practice (B) 
Determining current judicial and professional perceptions of and responses to domestic abuse 
in child arrangements and contact cases is no easy task as there is no research or monitoring 
data available on such proceedings for the past three years. It is to the reported cases, 
therefore, that we must look to gain some insight into current judicial and professional 
perceptions and practices. However, these cannot provide a representative sample of all such 
cases since they only reflect the very small number of cases that go to appeal. Additionally, 
since LASPO was implemented, the numbers of cases that have been appealed and therefore 
reported have reduced substantially. The reported cases may also be atypical of judicial 
practice generally since they largely involve refusals by trial judges to order direct contact 
between fathers and children, which is extremely rare.68 Nevertheless, they provide us with 
some insight into the way in which a small minority of trial judges are responding to coercive 
control, and into the attitudes and messages emanating from the higher courts, which are ‘a 
powerful interpretive lens in shaping how family law professionals respond to mothers and 
fathers involved in custody disputes’.69 
 
All child arrangements/contact cases reported from the end of 2013 until October 2016 were 
reviewed. Eight cases were identified where domestic violence was an issue, all perpetrated 
by fathers of the subject children.70 Five of these cases involved appeals by fathers against 
                                                            
66  Women’s Aid, Nineteen Child Homicides. What must change so children are put first in child contact 
arrangements and the family courts (Women’s Aid, 2016) at p 27; see also ibid 
67 Women’s Resource Centre, Women’s Equality in the UK – A health check (Women’s Resource Centre, 2013)  
68 See, eg, Ministry of Justice, Judicial and Court Statistics 2011 (Ministry of Justice, 2012); M Harding and A 
Newnham, How do County Courts Share the Care of children Between Parents? Full Report (University of 
Warwick, University of Reading, 2015) 
69 V Elizabeth, E Gavey & J Tolmie, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Resident Mothers and the Moral 
Dilemmas they Face During Custody Disputes’ (2010) 18 Feminist Legal Studies 253-274 at p 255 
70 This period was selected because Barnett had already reviewed cases reported up to September 2013 – see 
A Barnett, Contact at all costs? Domestic violence, child contact and the practices of the family courts and 
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orders refusing direct contact, one involved an appeal by a father against an order for 
professionally supervised contact, and one was an appeal by a non-resident mother against 
the refusal to make a contact order in her favour. Five of the seven appeals were allowed by 
the Court of Appeal. The eighth case was a first-instance decision by a High Court judge 
refusing direct contact between the father and children. In all these cases, a fact-finding 
exercise had been undertaken at which the fathers denied or minimised the allegations. 
 
The judgments in all eight cases reveal coercive and controlling behaviours by the fathers, 
although the trial and appellate judges do not always identify these as such. In all but one of 
the eight cases, trial judges made findings on the coercively controlling aspects of 
perpetrators’ behaviours, and their orders largely reflected how seriously they took these 
findings, although in some cases, physical violence was the determining factor. In Re M 
(Children) the trial judge held that the father had ‘ “failed to persuade me that he was not 
going to destabilise the family by continuing his violent, threatening, minimising behaviours, 
upsetting the children and harming them emotionally”.’71  In Re T (A Child: Suspension of 
Contact: Section 91(14) CA 1989) various judges at first instance had found the father to be 
unreasonable, argumentative, bullying and aggressive, ‘leaving the mother ostensibly 
vulnerable and undermined’.72  The trial judge considered the father’s overall conduct and its 
effect on the mother and child as so abusive that ‘the mother should not be subjected to his 
behaviour through the courts or otherwise for the foreseeable future’ and accordingly, refused 
to order direct contact and made an order under Section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 
prohibiting the father from making further applications for two years without permission of 
the court (‘a Section 91(14) order’).73 
 
In Re K (Children) both the guardian and the recorder identified a clear pattern of coercive 
and controlling behaviour but it was apparent that they did not consider this to be as serious 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
professionals (Brunel University, 2014). The sample cases were identified by reviewing the Bailii database, 
which is the most comprehensive and up-to-date source of reported cases - see http://www.bailii.org/  
Additionally, all cases reported in Family Law Reports from the end of 2013 to date were reviewed. 
71 Re M (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1147 per Macur LJ at [7], quoting the trial judge. 
72 Re T (A Child: Suspension of Contact: Section 91(14) CA 1989) [2015] EWCA Civ 719 per Tomlinson LJ at [13] 
73 Ibid per Tomlinson LJ at [30]. See also Re J-M (A Child) [2014] EWCA Civ 434, Re J-M (Contact Proceedings: 
Balance of Harm) [2015] 1 FLR 838; Re V (A Child) (Inadequate Reasons for Findings of Fact) [2015] EWCA Civ 
274; [2015] 2 FLR 1472 per McFarlane LJ at [10] 
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as incidents of physical assault.74  The recorder concluded that during the marriage the father 
had:  
 
‘ “Exhibited some controlling behaviour over mother perhaps consistent with his view of how 
his wife and the mother of his children should behave in the home extending to what she 
wore, extending to making her somewhat fearful about her position and requirement to 
conform. I accept that there was the incident in Holland but that has not been repeated and 
there is no evidence of recent physical violence between father and mother...There clearly has 
been aggressive confrontational behaviour by father which has reached a high pitch and 
which, in my judgment, has probably psychologically browbeaten mother but no more”.’75  
 
The most astute judicial understanding of coercive control can be found in the judgment of 
Russell J in FY v MY & others (Children). In an earlier hearing, Russell J had made findings 
on the father’s ‘abusive behaviour towards … [the mother], and the children, and concluded 
that he was controlling, abusive and manipulative’, a conclusion that was supported by 
subsequent events.76 Russell J contextualised the father’s conduct as an integral aspect of his 
parenting by highlighting that he not only physically and emotionally harmed the two older 
children, but also used them during contact to continue abusing and controlling the mother by 
making abusive and threatening phone calls and denigrating the mother to the children, which 
led her to order no direct contact, limit indirect contact, and make a Section 91(14) order.77  
 
The only reported case in which the trial judge’s findings, that included controlling 
behaviour, were not reflected in the order made was Re F (Children).78 The father sought a 
residence order in respect of his 13-year-old daughter who was living with him, with whom 
the mother sought contact. The father stalked the mother obsessively and alleged that she was 
having an affair with his 26-year-old son (her stepson), which was found to be untrue. The 
father had so inculcated the child with these views that she opposed all contact with her 
mother. The Cafcass officer found the father to be extremely ‘intimidating and aggressive’ 
and queried whether the child’s experiences of her father amounted to significant harm.79  
                                                            
74 Re K (Children) [2016] EWCA Civ 99 
75 Ibid per King LJ at [13], quoting the recorder’s judgment, emphasis added 
76 FY v MY & others (Children) [2016] EWFC 16 per Russell J at [3] 
77 Ibid at [130] 
78 Re F (Children) [2015] EWCA Civ 1315 
79 Ibid per McFarlane LJ at [10], quoting the Cafcass officer 
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The trial judge, however, completely ignored his own findings, focused only on the father’s 
application for a residence order (which he granted), and failed to even consider the mother’s 
contact application. The mother’s appeal was allowed, and the Court of Appeal castigated the 
trial judge for ignoring the Cafcass officer’s evidence, and failing to follow PD12J or to apply 
the welfare checklist.80  
 
The insights of some of these trial judges, with the notable exceptions of Re F (children) and 
Re K (Children), into the harm that may be posed by coercive and controlling behaviours 
have not always been shared by the Court of Appeal, which has been at pains to promote 
contact and in so doing, to downgrade and minimise anything other than severe, recent 
physical violence. So, for example, in Re J-M (A Child), the Court of Appeal strenuously 
emphasised that ‘contact should be terminated only in exceptional circumstances where there 
are cogent reasons for doing so, as a last resort, when there is no alternative, and only if 
contact will be detrimental to the child’s welfare’.81  These judicial pronouncements must be 
seen in the context of the recent amendment to the Children Act 1989, which provides that a 
court is ‘to presume, unless the contrary is shown, that involvement of that parent in the life 
of the child concerned will further the child’s welfare’, although none of the judgments 
mention this provision and are expressed in far more robust terms.82     
 
Re D is the only reported case in which the Court of Appeal refused the father’s appeal 
against an order for professionally supervised contact with his two children and a Section 
91(14) order. This may be attributed in no small part to the trial judge, the Guardian and the 
expert risk assessor illuminating the totality of the father’s conduct and its implications for 
his parenting of the child.83 The trial judge found proved all of the mother’s allegations of 
physical violence perpetrated against her by the father, and found that the father fabricated 
allegations of historic sexual abuse by the maternal grandfather. However, the full extent of 
the father’s coercively controlling behaviours emerge from the Guardian’s reports and the 
subsequent risk assessment undertaken by a domestic violence expert. The Guardian 
described the father as ‘volatile, unpredictable, aggressive, arrogant, undermining and lacking 
                                                            
80 Re F (Children) [2015] EWCA Civ 1315 
81  Re J-M (A Child) [2014] EWCA Civ 434, Re J-M (Contact Proceedings: Balance of Harm) [2015] 1 FLR 838 per 
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in empathy’.84 The expert risk assessment concluded that the father minimised the extent and 
impact of his conduct, displayed extreme hostility towards the mother, and noted that the 
mother ‘had been repeatedly subjected to emotional and psychological abuse by the father 
often in front of the children’.85 As discussed below, this case highlights the importance of 
placing the assessment of risk at the heart of child arrangement/contact cases where domestic 
violence is an issue. 
 
Historic abuse (B) 
One of the most concerning consequences of the incident-based approach to domestic 
violence is the perception that ‘old’ allegations of violence signify that the abuse is ‘in the 
past’ and therefore irrelevant to current child arrangements and contact. Pre-2014 research 
revealed that many judges and child welfare and legal professionals disregarded altogether 
allegations of  violence considered too ‘old’ or ‘historic’, as it was seen as irrelevant to 
current risk.86 Indeed, one of the most commonly reported reasons why fact-finding hearings 
might not be held was because the allegations were perceived as too ‘old’: ‘ “Too many very 
minor and historic allegations are brought up which have no relevance to future 
arrangements, thus wasting Court time and causing delay in contact between the applicant 
and the children which is not in their best interests.” (B261, NW)’.87 A minority of 
respondents to Hunter and Barnett’s survey even reported that they would advise a client not 
to raise the issue of domestic violence at all if the allegations were ‘old’ or ‘historic’.88 
However, Hunter and Barnett point out that such allegations may not be so readily 
disregarded if they are understood ‘in the context of a pattern of controlling behaviour, in 
which such “old” incidents have a continuing terrorizing effect’.89 
 
The perception that ‘historic’ abuse is irrelevant to current child arrangements or contact was 
also evident in the political arena. Regulations made under LASPO restricted legal aid to 
cases where evidence of domestic violence was not more than 24 months old at the date of 
                                                            
84 Re D (Children) [2016] EWCA Civ 89 per Baker J at [24] 
85 Ibid per Baker J at [13] 
86  Women’s Aid, Nineteen Child Homicides. What must change so children are put first in child contact 
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application for legal aid.90 The government’s stated reason for imposing a time restriction 
was that it ‘is an on-going test of the relevance of the abuse’.91  This restriction met with 
huge opposition from stakeholders, politicians, policy-makers, lawyers and the judiciary, 
many of whom criticised the arbitrary nature of the two-year time limit.92 Some critics 
pointed out that the evidence may become ‘out of date’ despite the perpetrator remaining high 
risk, that some women may feel unready to pursue legal proceedings within two years of 
leaving a violent relationship and others may feel that they would be more at risk if they did 
so.93  
 
Some legal professionals who responded to the Commons Select Committee inquiry into 
LASPO in 2014 pointed out that the imposition of any time limit on evidence for legal aid 
does not reflect the ongoing, cumulative nature of coercive control: ‘For victims of anything 
bar the most trivial abuse two years is not a long time, and they may have been the subject of 
ongoing controlling or coercive behaviour through contact arrangements in the meantime.’94  
 
The two-year time limit on evidence was a key issue in the Rights of Women case. The main 
issue on which the Court of Appeal focused was whether the two-year time limit on gateway 
evidence in Regulation 33 frustrated the purpose of LASPO. Allowing the appeal, the Court 
of Appeal concluded that there is ‘no obvious correlation between the passage of such a 
comparatively short period of time as 24 months and the harm to the victim of domestic 
violence disappearing or even significantly diminishing. … [The 24-month time limit] 
operates in a completely arbitrary manner’.95 In response to this decision, the government 
amended Regulation 33 as an interim measure by substituting a time limit of 60 months for 
                                                            
90 The original proposal was for a 12-month limit. See Justice, Reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales: the 
Government Response, Cm 8072 (TSO, 2011) at para 25 
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2015) at p 10  
92 Written evidence from the FLBA at p 2. See also written evidence from the FJC at p 8. 
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the 24-month limit.96 In February 2017 it was reported that the Ministry of Justice intends to 
abolish time limits altogether.97 
 
The decision of the Court of Appeal in the Rights of Women case was welcomed by a range 
of legal professional bodies including the Law Society and Resolution.98 The question to 
consider is whether the increased insights into the importance of apparently ‘historic’ 
allegations of domestic abuse, demonstrated by politicians, policy makers, legal professionals 
and the judiciary during the LASPO debates, signify a real rather than an apparent shift in the 
way in which domestic abuse is understood.  
 
The recently reported cases suggest that the appellate judiciary (and in some cases, the trial 
judges) still perceive ‘historic’ incidents of violence to be irrelevant to child arrangements/ 
contact. In Re V (A Child) (Inadequate Reasons for Findings of Fact), McFarlane LJ 
emphasised the fact that all but one of the allegations took place prior to the child’s birth or 
when he was still an infant.99 For this reason, he said, ‘most, if not all, of the allegations 
listed on the schedule were not in fact relevant to whether or not young T in 2012/2013, who 
had been having contact with his father, including staying contact, at whatever regularity, 
could carry on having contact to this father in the future’.100 By disaggregating and 
minimising the ‘incidents’ of abuse, McFarlane LJ discounted what appears to have been an 
ongoing pattern of coercive control. In Re K (Children) the recorder dismissed as irrelevant 
an ‘incident’ of physical violence that took place five years earlier on the basis that there was 
‘no evidence of recent physical violence between father and mother’, failing to contextualise 
its relevance within his findings of continuing controlling, aggressive behaviour.101 
 
The way in which judges and professionals understand domestic abuse has important 
implications for the ability of women to ‘prove’ the abuse they have sustained, as well as for 
the proper assessment of risk. Although most of the trial judges in the small sample of 
recently reported cases discussed herein did identify and make findings on fathers’ coercive 
                                                            
96 Civil Legal Aid (Procedure) (Amendment) Regulations 2016, reg 2(2), which came into force on 25 April 2016 
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and controlling behaviours, and to varying extents took on board their seriousness, current 
family law and procedure discourages this, by continuing to focus on proving incidents of 
physical violence rather than patterns of coercive control. 
 
‘Proving’ coercive control: an unfair burden on mothers? (A) 
The incident-based approach to domestic violence dominates the issue of ‘proof’ in both 
private family law proceedings and in the ability of victims to access legal aid for such 
proceedings. The documentation required from victims of domestic violence in order to 
access legal aid in private family law cases largely typifies that which would evidence 
incidents of physical violence, including the granting of protective injunctions, perpetrators’ 
convictions for violence or abuse towards their families, reports from medical professionals, 
Domestic Violence Protection Notices and Orders, and letters from refuges.102 
 
Numerous stakeholder groups and researchers highlighted the enormous difficulties for 
women in providing evidence ‘that they simply do not have’ of the abuse they have 
sustained.103 For example, the majority of women who have sustained domestic violence do 
not report the abuse to the police or seek injunctive relief.104 However, coercive control can 
be even harder to detect and consequently to evidence ‘because its means and effects merge 
with behaviors widely associated with women’s devalued status in personal life’.105 For these 
reasons, a common criticism of LASPO was that the gateway criteria failed to reflect 
women’s experiences of domestic violence.106 Indeed, the Court of Appeal in the Rights of 
Women case accepted that victims of financial abuse ‘will not be able to obtain any of the 
verifications required by regulation 33’, and this was one of the reasons for holding that 
Regulation 33 of the Community Legal Aid (Procedure) Regulations 2012 (‘Regulation 33’) 
frustrated the purposes of LASPO.107   
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As a consequence of the concerted opposition to the evidence criteria, the government 
progressively widened them.108 However, the additions to the gateway evidence continued to 
presuppose that the abuse sustained was discrete incidents of physical violence.  
 
In the court arena, the most significant manifestation of the incident-based approach to 
domestic violence is the fact-finding hearing which, as the name indicates, is intended to 
determine specific ‘facts’. This approach is underpinned by their origins in care proceedings 
in relation to the local authority’s obligation to prove that the ‘threshold criteria’ are met.109 
Bracewell J in Re S (Care Proceedings: Split Hearing) explained that cases suitable for such 
hearings ‘would be likely to be cases in which there is a clear and stark issue, such as sexual 
abuse or physical abuse’.110 The fact-finding hearing, therefore, is itself a product of the 
incident-based approach to domestic violence, and places undue weight on finding ‘the truth’ 
rather than assessing risk. 
 
 From the outset of the fact-finding process, the incident narrative can work to erase the abuse 
women have sustained. Courts have to ‘consider the nature of any allegation, admission or 
evidence of domestic violence or abuse, and the extent to which it would be likely to be 
relevant in deciding whether to make a child arrangements order and, if so, in what terms’.111 
This provision discourages investigating patterns of coercive control because it assumes ‘a 
linear relationship between particular incidents and specific harms’ and obscures ‘the totality 
of the perpetrator’s behaviour’.112 With respect to the recently reported cases, this is 
demonstrated by the approach of the Court of Appeal in Re V (A Child) (Inadequate Reasons 
for Findings of Fact).113 The father’s appeal was allowed and the case was remitted for 
rehearing to a new judge who, McFarlane LJ said, ‘must actively consider whether any, and if 
so which, of the allegations on the current schedule do in fact need to be relitigated’.114 This 
approach was expressly based on McFarlane LJ’s interpretation of PD12J. He stated that it 
was not apparent that the trial judge had ‘engaged in the process that the Practice Direction 
requires in deciding whether what is on the schedule of allegations is relevant to the issues 
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which would be current in the subsequent welfare decision for the child’.115 Additionally, 
Hunter and Barnett found that many legal professionals and judges considered that only ‘real’ 
or ‘extremely serious’ violence would provide grounds for a fact-finding hearing.116 
 
PD12J further provides that if the court decides that a separate fact-finding hearing is 
necessary, it should consider ‘what are the key facts in dispute’ and whether these should be 
itemised in a Scott Schedule completed by both parties (which requires the victim to specify 
the dates and details of each individual ‘incident’ of abuse and the alleged perpetrator to 
respond to each separate allegation).117 The use of Scott Schedules means that women are 
compelled to articulate the abuse they have sustained within the discursive framework of the 
incident-based approach to domestic violence, further rendering invisible coercive and 
controlling behaviours. This erasure is reinforced by courts ‘carving up’ disputes on the basis 
of limited admissions, or restricting the fact-finding hearing to a few ‘sample’ incidents, 
which means ‘that the full extent of the risk posed to the mother and child is minimised or 
even invisible’.118 Since April 2014 courts also need to consider ‘what evidence is required in 
order to determine the existence of a pattern of coercive, controlling or threatening behaviour, 
violence or abuse’, as an alternative to requiring evidence about ‘incidents’ of physical 
violence.119  In the absence of any current empirical data, it is not known whether judges are 
undertaking this exercise, although there is no indication in the recent case law that the trial 
judges did apply this provision. 
 
If the fact-finding exercise is undertaken, the burden is on the party who asserts that domestic 
violence occurred to prove ‘the truth’ of her allegations on the balance of probabilities. If 
judges cannot decide which parent is telling the truth, they can fall back on the burden of 
proof and find that the mother has not ‘proved her case’, as any doubts are resolved in favour 
of the respondent to the allegations.120 Judges have particular difficulty determining ‘the 
truth’ where coercive control is in issue as it ‘lacks the fungibility of violence’ and, 
                                                            
115 Ibid per McFarlane LJ at [37] 
116 Ibid, at p 31 
117 PD12J, at para 19 
118 A Barnett, Contact at all costs? Domestic violence, child contact and the practices of the family courts and 
professionals (Brunel University, 2014) at p 258; see also R Hunter and A Barnett, Fact-Finding Hearings and 
the Implementation of the President’s Practice Direction: Residence and Contact Orders: Domestic Violence and 
Harm (Family Justice Council, 2013) 
119 PD12J at para 19(d) 
120 See Re B (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2008] UKHL 35 per Lord Hoffman at [31] 
24 
 
frequently, the only evidence available is the parties’ oral testimony.121 The burden of proof 
in such cases may assist the court, but severely disadvantage the victim. 
 
The majority of trial judges in the recently reported sample of cases did not overtly rely 
solely on the burden of proof when making (or not making) findings. An example of where 
this did occur, however, is Re V (Inadequate Reasons for Findings of Fact), in which the 
mother alleged that after separation, the father would ‘bombard’ her ‘with threatening text 
messages, telephone calls and Facebook communications’.122 The trial judge found this 
allegation ‘not proved’ on the basis ‘that the onus of proof was on the mother and she had 
simply failed to provide any evidence of the relevant text messages or Facebook 
communications’.123  This reliance on the burden of proof to find against the mother had 
extremely serious consequences in this case. McFarlane LJ found the judge’s conclusion 
‘important…because it is the one aspect of the schedule of allegations which directly relates 
to the time when the father was having contact with T’.124 This led to the Court of Appeal 
highlighting the ‘historical’ nature of the findings that were made against the father, which 
was one of the reasons why his appeal was allowed.  
 
Although it is not possible to discern from the judgments given in the eight reported cases 
exactly what evidence was adduced on which findings were (or were not) made, it is apparent 
that in all cases, great reliance was placed on the parties’ oral evidence because the trial judge 
is best placed to ‘observe their demeanour and credibility’.125 The way in which victims of 
domestic abuse are perceived by judges and professionals, therefore, has important 
consequences for their ability to ‘prove’ the abuse they have sustained. 
 
The ‘false allegations’ narrative (B) 
‘ “It’s like you have to prove yourself not to be a liar before anyone listens to you.” ’126  
 
                                                            
121 E Stark, Coercive Control How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (Oxford University Press, 2007) at p 372 
122 Re V (Inadequate Reasons for Findings of Fact) [2015] EWCA Civ 274; [2015] 2 FLR 1472 per McFarlane LJ at 
[25] 
123 Ibid at [26] 
124 Ibid 
125 Re M (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1147 per Macur LJ at [11].  
126 C Harrison, ‘Implacably Hostile or Appropriately Protective?: Women Managing Child Contact in the Context 
of Domestic Violence’ (2008) 14(4) Violence Against Women 381-405 at p 394 
25 
 
Judges’ and professionals’ perceptions of women involved in private law Children Act 
proceedings are informed by prevailing legal, political and child welfare discourses that 
valorise fatherhood and render invisible the father’s conduct, giving rise to gendered 
subjectivities of ‘implacably hostile mothers’ and ‘safe family men’.127 So the discursive and 
ideological context in which coercive control has emerged is already populated by images of 
hostile, lying mothers and victimized fathers.  
 
This was starkly evident in the debates around LASPO where concerns were expressed by 
government that mothers may make false allegations of domestic violence for the purposes of 
obtaining legal aid. Indeed, the ‘false allegation’ narrative is explicitly the reason for the 
introduction of the strict gateway evidence. According to government: ‘We note concerns 
raised in consultation responses about the risk of creating an incentive for false allegations of 
domestic violence. That is why clear, objective evidence is needed.’128 The same argument 
was pursued by the government in the Rights of Women case: ‘ “The evidence list has been 
drafted taking account of the need for objective evidence of the need to target legal aid to 
genuine cases without providing an incentive for unfounded allegations of domestic 
violence.” ’129  
 
The requirement for ‘objective evidence’, therefore, ‘risks the perverse outcome of 
perpetuating the culture of disbelief about violence against women’, an outcome that may be 
compounded for women who do not conform to victim stereotypes.130  As Lord Macdonald 
observed: ‘[the Bill] appears to step backwards in expecting victims of domestic violence to 
conform to a stereotype of conduct, so that they will not be believed, their gateway will be 
shut and they will not get legal aid.’131 However, the ‘real issue’, as Baroness Scotland 
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commented, is ‘how we persuade and enable those who are in need of the succour that can be 
provided to come forward, not how we stop them making false allegations’.132 
 
The focus on isolated incidents of physical violence and the inability of many courts and 
professionals to understand coercive control, reinforced by discourses of irrational, lying, 
manipulative mothers, can lead to the mother’s uncorroborated oral testimony being viewed 
with suspicion and discounted as not being ‘real’ evidence.133 This may be compounded by 
stereotypic images of ‘typical’ victims and victim behaviour. A barrister interviewed by 
Barnett in 2011 gave an example of a case where the judge found that the mother had been 
fabricating the allegations because she was ‘ “a solicitor and very well dressed and came 
across very well”. [Ms A3, Barrister, London]’134  
 
There is also a perception that mothers who are ‘credible’ in their testimony should be able to 
provide a coherent narrative. A barrister interviewed by Barnett in 2011 observed: ‘ “But 
there are some allegations that it’s self-evidently, well, someone’s description of the incidents 
is relatively poor or weak or confused, the court is unlikely to make those findings.” [Ms S, 
Barrister, NW]’135 In Re V (Children) (Inadequate Reasons for Findings of Fact) McFarlane 
LJ unpicked the trial judge’s findings against the mother by comparing what the mother had 
said in her Scott Schedule against her oral evidence and that of her witnesses and in so doing, 
found inconsistencies and contradictions.136 The assumption that domestic violence emerges 
and is accounted for in a rational, chronological and coherent way demonstrates a failure to 
understand the effects of abuse on women, whose coping strategies can include ‘dissociating 
themselves from the violence, “forgetting” about abuse, retaining vague and sketchy 
memories of violent incidents, [and] minimising the seriousness of the violence’.137 
 
Where judges have a greater understanding of coercive control and its interconnection with 
parenting, they appear to have more insight into the parties’ credibility. In FY v MY & others 
(Children) Russell J found that the father’s oral and written evidence reflected his self-
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absorption and inability to understand his children’s emotional needs.138 Her assessment of 
the mother as ‘very child-centred’ and ‘committed to maintaining a relationship between F 
and the children’ was supported by the expert’s and the guardian’s impressions of her and 
was ‘apparent in how she gave her evidence to me and the thoughtful way in which she 
answered the questions put to her’.139   
 
It is clear that separate fact-finding hearings fail to capture or reflect women’s and children’s 
experiences of domestic abuse. In order to respond appropriately and protectively to those 
experiences, we need to place them at the forefront and heart of the proceedings by focusing 
on the totality of the risk, rather than isolating individual acts of physical violence and 
ignoring the context of coercive control. Accordingly, it is suggested that domestic abuse 
would more productively be dealt with in ‘composite’ hearings to gain a full appreciation of 
children’s and parents’ experiences rather than in discrete fact-finding hearings. Abandoning 
separate fact-finding hearings would mean that decisions could be made holistically and 
coercive control recognised as an indivisible aspect of the child’s and victim’s lives and, in 
many cases, as defining their lives. This could be encouraged by holding fully inquisitorial, 
rather than adversarial, hearings, a procedure that is already encouraged by Paragraph 28 of 
PD12J. The mother, then, would no longer have to bear the burden of proving specific 
‘incidents’, and perpetrators would no longer be able to rely simply on denials. This would 
also encourage a better understanding of denial as a hallmark of the abuse itself, and the 
perceived ‘need’ for evidence as stemming from those denials. 
 
Assessing risk (A) 
One of the reasons for the introduction of PD12J was to encourage better assessment of risk 
and welfare. PD12J requires the court to make an order for contact only ‘if it can be satisfied 
that the physical and emotional safety of the child and the parent with whom the child is 
living, as far as possible, can be secured before during and after contact, and that the parent 
with whom the child is living will not be subjected to further controlling or coercive 
behaviour by the other parent’.140 Paragraph 37 of PD12J requires the court to consider the 
effect of the abuse on the child, the motivation of the perpetrator in seeking contact, the likely 
behaviour of the perpetrator during contact, and the capacity of the parents to appreciate the 
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effects of the abuse on the child. These provisions implement the recommendations of the 
expert report to the court in Re L, V, M, H (Contact: Domestic Violence),141 which urged 
courts to focus on the full risk to the child posed by the perpetrator.142 However, these 
provisions can only operate effectively if coercive control is fully understood, and if the 
ambit of the court’s inquiry is not restricted by the incident-based fact-finding process. If 
courts downplay or disregard apparently ‘minor incidents’ of violence and other intimidating, 
isolating and controlling behaviours and focus only on proven incidents of recent physical 
violence, they may miss the full extent of the ‘larger regime of dominance’.143   
 
Evidence from research undertaken prior to 2013 strongly suggests that risk was not always 
adequately assessed because the nature of the abuse was misunderstood.144  Additionally, risk 
can be under-estimated or discounted because many judges and professionals fail to 
understand the way in which coercively controlling men may portray themselves as 
charming, reasonable and benign, so that they may ‘be convinced by men’s presentation as 
Dr Jekyll and miss the Mr Hyde of behind closed doors’.145  As a consequence, judges were 
reluctant to accept that an abusive father could be motivated by anything other than a desire 
to see the child.146 Additionally, as a consequence of the ‘paradox’ that plays out in family 
proceedings whereby ‘a parent can be seen as a violent perpetrator of domestic abuse and a 
good enough father’ the parenting capacity of perpetrators may be over-estimated, not be 
sufficiently assessed, or considered at all.147 On the other hand, it was found that those judges 
and professionals who understood coercive control, its effects on women and children, and 
the strategies of perpetrators were more likely to require and undertake the broader 
assessment required by Paragraph 37.148 
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An analysis of the sample of recently reported cases suggests that the appellate courts focus 
almost solely on the risk of physical violence (in some cases only to the child) by continuing 
to disaggregate individual incidents of violence from patterns of coercive control. For 
example, in Re M (Children) the Court of Appeal allowed the father’s appeal because the trial 
judge failed ‘to adequately address why the children’s safety and the management of the 
mother’s anxieties cannot be achieved under any circumstances of supervision’.149 
Additionally, images of ‘safe family men’ may undermine efforts by trial judges to hold 
fathers to account. In Re K (Children), the Court of Appeal castigated the guardian and the 
trial judge for requiring the father to apologise to the children and to the mother for his 
behaviour and demonstrate that he had changed, instead of commending them for what 
appears to have been a proper application of Paragraph 37 of PD12J.150 On the other hand, in 
Re D (Children) the Court of Appeal wholeheartedly approved the making of an order for 
professionally supervised contact and a Section 91(14) order, because they had the benefit of 
the keen insights of the trial judge, the guardian and the expert risk assessor into the father’s 
coercively controlling behaviour and its implications for the child’s and the mother’s safety 
and emotional welfare, and its effect on the mother-child relationship.151   
 
The holding of fully inquisitorial hearings, led by expert risk assessment rather than preceded 
by adversarial fact-finding hearings that ‘decontextualise incidents of violence from the 
fabric of the relationship’ would enable courts ‘to gain a full understanding of the risks to 
children and to the other party of the perpetrator’s behaviour’ and discourage the dismissal of 
‘historic’ abuse.152  This approach should also enhance the ability of Cafcass officers to apply 
the Domestic Abuse Practice Pathway, which provides practitioners with ‘a structured, 
focused and stepped framework for assessing risk in cases where domestic abuse is a feature’, 
including coercive or controlling behaviours.153 
 
Conclusion (A) 
Prior to the LASPO debates, research suggests that some judges and professionals working in 
the family justice system were beginning to acquire an awareness of domestic violence as 
                                                            
149 Re M (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1147 per Macur LJ at [19] 
150 Re K (Children) [2016] EWCA Civ 99 
151 Re D (Children) [2016] EWCA Civ 89 
152 R Hunter and A Barnett, Fact-Finding Hearings and the Implementation of the President’s Practice Direction: 
Residence and Contact Orders: Domestic Violence and Harm (Family Justice Council, 2013) at p 47 
153 Cafcass, Practice Pathway: A structured approach to risk assessment in Domestic Abuse (Cafcass, 2016) 
30 
 
encompassing wider behaviours than solely physical violence. The withdrawal of legal aid 
under LASPO and the groundswell of sympathy and support it generated for victims of 
domestic violence revealed an even greater awareness of the many forms domestic abuse may 
take and of the relevance of ‘historic’ abuse to child arrangements and contact. However, 
there is a difference between awareness and full understanding, and whether this marks a sea 
change in judicial and professional understandings of coercive control and its effects on 
victims and children is questionable. It is not known whether the ability to identify patterns of 
coercive control and understand their significance for contact demonstrated by some trial 
judges in the recent case law extends to the majority of the judiciary in the lower courts. 
However, it is suggested that, if this was the case, there would have been far more appeals 
against orders refusing contact between children and abusive fathers, because of the striking 
success rate of those appeals that have been made.  
 
Continuous and compulsory training on domestic abuse for the judiciary and legal 
professionals, delivered by specialist domestic violence services, should go some way to 
enabling judges and professionals to understand, identify and respond appropriately to 
coercive control.154 However, this alone may not be sufficient to achieve a genuine 
transformation in the way in which courts and professionals respond to domestic abuse in 
child arrangement/contact cases, because of two primary and interrelated aspects of the 
process which continue to challenge and subvert a complete cultural shift. Firstly, the drive to 
promote contact ‘at all costs’ contributes to the perception that anything other than recent 
incidents of severe physical violence are irrelevant or unimportant. This, in turn, inhibits a 
real understanding of the nature and risks of parenting by abusive men.155 What we now 
know about the strategies, techniques and tactics employed by coercively controlling men 
and the devastating effects of these on mothers and children, should lead us to question the 
benefits for children of parenting by fathers who use coercion and control to dominate and 
subjugate mothers. However, recent case law suggests that even when the Court of Appeal 
acknowledges the abuse perpetrated by the father, contact is still strenuously promoted. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the ‘contact at all costs’ approach has been strengthened by 
the presumption of parental involvement enshrined in Section 1(2A) of the Children Act 1989 
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and in Paragraph 4 of PD12J. Although no research is available on the operation of this 
provision, Women’s Aid report that since its implementation, ‘there are growing concerns 
amongst some practitioners and academics that the courts are prioritising contact with an 
abusive parent over the safety of the child and non-abusive parent’.156 In his recent review of 
PD12J, Mr Justice Cobb recommended that Paragraph 4 of PD12J should be amended  to 
provide that: ‘Where the involvement of a parent in a child’s life would put the child or other 
parent at risk of suffering harm arising from domestic violence or abuse, the presumption in 
section 1(2A) of the Children Act 1989 shall not apply.’157 While it is hoped that, if 
implemented, this change will encourage both the lower and higher courts to place safety, 
rather than the promotion of contact, at the heart of child arrangement proceedings, there is a 
danger that its proper application may be undermined by a continued focus on incidents of 
recent, physical violence rather than on patterns of coercive and controlling behaviour.  
 
Secondly, the requirement for ‘objective’ evidence to access legal aid, and the nature and 
process of the fact-finding exercise, reinforce the incident narrative of domestic violence. 
This compounds the difficulties women may have in proving the full extent of the abuse they 
have sustained. We have seen how the parties’ oral testimony may be filtered through 
dominant subjectivities of ‘safe family men’ and ‘lying, manipulative mothers’ and 
stereotypes of ‘real’ victims and perpetrators. These difficulties are exacerbated by the 
complainant having to bear the burden of proof, resulting in an unfair burden on mothers to 
prove domestic abuse. This strongly suggests that domestic abuse would more productively 
be dealt with in ‘composite’ hearings rather than discrete fact-finding hearings, which would 
not only bring the full extent of the abuse into plain sight, but also enable courts and 
professionals to understand domestic abuse as an indivisible aspect of parenting and family 
life. It is also hoped that this will no longer mean that fathers who have had findings of abuse 
made against them after contesting allegations will be ‘rewarded’ with unsupervised or even 
staying contact.158 A more holistic approach should produce better risk assessments, which 
would focus not only on ‘predicting the likelihood of discrete incidents of physical violence 
or abuse’ but on the totality of the perpetrator’s behaviours, including whether the mother 
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will be subjected to further coercion and/or control.159 A further step in the right direction 
would be substituting the ‘incident’ terminology in PD12J with a description of coercive 
control that focuses on the perpetrator’s agency and on patterns of abuse, rather than 
‘stretching’ the incident terminology to include other tactics of coercion and control.   
 
While these suggestions may not, in themselves, transform the gendered structural 
inequalities underpinning coercive control, they may contribute towards a shift in the 
discursive and ideological hierarchies informing current family law which deny mothers the 
autonomy and freedom from entrapment after parental separation that is unquestioningly 
afforded to fathers. To achieve this, we need to ‘transcend those binaries which are seen to 
have constrained understandings of social practice within liberal legal thought’ by subverting 
the misleading dichotomy between physical and psychological/emotional abuse.160 This 
should lead to a greater appreciation of the embodied brutality of entrapment by coercive 
control. Without such an understanding, courts may continue ‘depicting the bars without 
grasping that they are part of a cage’.161 
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